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The Confederacy's most victorious army, the Army of Northern
Virginia, had successfully thwarted numerous Union threats against the
Confederate capitol of Richmond. Often outnumbered and out gunned, this
army, under the guidance of General Robert E. Lee, had won strategically
important victories at Fredericksburg, Virginia in 1862, and
Chancellorsville, Virginia in May 1863. By that June, Lee's army enjoyed a
surge of confidence in itself having frustrated the much larger Union
Army of the Potomac with constant reversals and high casualties.
President Lincoln had appointed commander after commander to no avail- Lee
defeated each and avery one. There was a bright spot for the Union cause
that summer with the Union Army under General Ulysses S. Grant having
encircled Vicksburg, Mississippi, the last great Confederate stronghold on
the Mississippi River. As critical as Vicksburg was, Lincoln, and his
Confederate counterpart Jefferson Davis, knew all too well that events in
Virginia were going to decide the outcome of the conflict.
General
Robert E. Lee was not ready to sit idle and wait for the next Union
thrust after Chancellorsville. He had communicated with Richmond for
several months on his desire to make another invasion of the North and by
late May saw an opportunity to take the initiative while Union forces
appeared to be in disarray. Lee's objectives were quite simple: take the
war out of Virginia so that the land could recover, a necessary measure to
provide relief to farms and farmland devastated by battle and foraging
armies, and to gather supplies for his hungry army. His army's movement
north of the Potomac River would not only force the Union Army out of
Virginia, but hopefully also draw Union troops away from the ongoing siege
of Vicksburg. Once his army had raided northern territory, he could gather
his troops for battle in an area to his liking where advantages of
position could force the Union to attack and Lee counterattack as
opportunities were presented. Politically, Lee reasoned a conclusive
victory on northern soil would add weight to the growing Northern peace
movement, apply pressure to the Lincoln administration to end the war and
sue for peace, and provide sufficient reason for official recognition of
the Confederacy by European powers. Only the political diplomacy of the
Lincoln administration had kept England and France from recognizing the
southern government as an independent nation. Lee's argument was
reasonable to Jefferson Davis and though the Confederate president was
nervous about Richmond not being fully protected by Lee's forces, he
approved the plan. While Lee's army made
preparations to march, the Army of the Potomac rested in their old
winter camps opposite Fredericksburg while its commander, Major General
Joseph Hooker, wrestled with innumerable predicaments. Not only were Lee's
intentions perplexing Hooker, his relationship with War Department
officials in Washington had become almost hostile. The flamboyant Hooker
had rebuilt morale and discipline in the army after the disastrous "Mud
March" in the winter of 1863, and in late April brilliantly moved the bulk
of his forces around Lee's army concentrated at Fredericksburg. Despite
the Union advantage, Lee and his top general "Stonewall" Jackson,
countered Hooker's strategy and soundly defeated him. Hooker's bluster and
bravado before the campaign meant nothing after his miserable failure at
the Battle of Chancellorsville. Many in the War Department had lost faith
in the general's abilities, including President Lincoln who soon believed
Hooker unsuited to contend with Lee. Hooker
approved a plan to probe Lee's defenses and on June 9, the army's cavalry
under General Alfred Pleasanton made a surprise attack on General "JEB"
Stuart's cavalry camps near Brandy Station, Virginia. Pleasanton's
troopers surprised Stuart, but withdrew when Confederate infantry were
sighted approaching the battlefield. From this information, Hooker
realized that Lee's forces were no longer concentrated in front of him at
Fredericksburg. Yet, indecision seemed to strike General Hooker again. He
waited for nearly a week before ordering his troops to break camp and then
marched cautiously northward, keeping his army between Washington and the
suspected Confederate route of march. By this time, Lee's troops had
already defeated a Union force at Winchester, Virginia, and crossed the
Potomac River into Maryland. Despite the
loss of "Stonewall" Jackson, the Army of Northern Virginia was
never stronger both in manpower and high morale than in the summer of
1863. "It was an army of veterans," recalled A.H. Belo, Colonel of the
55th North Carolina Infantry, "an army that had in two years' time made a
record second to none for successful fighting and hard marching." In
mid-June, Lee's soldiers crossed the Potomac River and stepped into a rich
land barely touched by the war. Except for some persistent Union cavalry
units, the southerners tramped along unopposed as militia units retreated
from their path leaving the land and its residents to the mercy of the
Confederates.
For Lee's men who had been living for months on
reduced rations, Maryland and Pennsylvania were bursting with plenty. "I
can hardly believe that a rebel army has actually left poor Virginia for a
season," wrote Major Eugene Blackford of the 5th Alabama Infantry. "Of
course there is no end of milk and butter which our soldiers enjoy
hugely." Encounters with the civilian population of Maryland and
Pennsylvania made for good subject matter in letters home such as that of
Private William McClellan of the 9th Alabama Infantry, who described
Pennsylvanians as, "the most ignorant beings of the world. They don't care
how long the war lasts so they are not troubled." Like many of his
comrades, McClellan especially detested the females who, "would not look
at a Rebel, they would turn up their nose and toss their heads to one side
as contemp(t)uously as if we were high way Robers."
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